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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL MEDIA AND FEAR: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A CATALYST FOR
POLITICAL FEAR IN THE UNITED STATES

Shane R. White

November 19, 2010
Abstract: Using the American National Election Study data
from the 2012 and 2016 surveys I explore how social media
usage shapes fear. This is likely caused by the nature of
social media leading to oversharing of sensationalized
articles likely to elicit an emotional and fearful
response. My findings suggest first that social media usage
has a statistically significant effect on whether they
would say they are afraid of a candidate (2012) and how
afraid they say they are of the candidates (2016). Second,
social media has little effect on economic fear, and may
actually make people more hopeful about the economy. Third,
that this effect is strongest amongst millennial voters.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments.................................iii
Abstract........................................iv
List Of Tables..................................vi
List of Figures.................................vii

Chapters
I. Introduction.................................1
Ii. Literature Review...........................3
Social Media And Political Behavior........4
The Digital Divide.........................10
Political Fear.............................14
Media’s Impact On Emotions.................19
Social Media And Emotions..................20
Social Media Use And Fear..................23
Social Media Use And Political
Fear And Anger.............................25
Hypotheses.................................27
Iii. Data And Measurements......................29
Iv. Analysis And Results........................45
V. Discussion...................................53
References......................................55
Curriculum Vitae................................67

v

LIST OF TABLES
4.1. 2012 Candidate Fear Regression............45
4.2. 2012 Economic Fear Regression.............47
4.3. 2016 Candidate Fear Regression............49
4.4. 2016 Economic Fear Regression.............51

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
3.1. 2012 Social Media Usage Index.............31
3.2. 2016 Social Media Usage Index.............32
3.3. 2012 Candidate Fear Index.................34
3.4. 2016 Candidate Fear Index.................35
3.5. 2012 Economic Fear Index..................37
3.6. 2016 Economic Fear Index..................37
3.7. ANES 2012 Candidate and Economic Indices..43
3.8. ANES 2016 Candidate and Economic Indices..44
4.1. 2012 Social Media Usage and
Fear of Candidates...................46
4.2. 2012 Social Media Usage and
Economic Fear........................48
4.3. 2016 Social Media Usage and
Fear of Candidates...................50
4.4. 2016 Social Media Usage and
Economic Fear........................51

vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Social media has become an increasingly large part of
our lives. Social media has evolved since MySpace started
in 2005, it now adds several platforms including Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and LinkedIn. These have
become core pieces of our identity, pieces that people can
anonymously peruse and judge. Many of us spend hours a day
reading statuses and tweets, looking at pictures and other
posts. Many are using it to aggregate news and information
feeds all into one place.
People often feel that the world is becoming a meaner,
scarier, more dangerous place. News articles run
sensationalized headlines, like the Time magazine headline
“Why Americans Are More Afraid Than They Used to Be”
(Rothman, 2016) or the Rolling Stone article “Why We’re
Living in the Age of Fear. This is the safest time in human
1

history. So why are we all so afraid?” (Strauss, 2016),
while hard data says something different. The world is
becoming a safer and less dangerous place. As a culture, we
are standing up to the abuses subjected on many of our
peers in the past. There is no longer a looming threat of
nuclear war, and terrorism, the 21st century equivalent, is
exceedingly rare in most of the world. But, fear does seem
to be increasing. Social media algorithms show us only
things it assumes that interest us. Has this made
horrifying click bait seem even more prominent or enticing?
Has this made fear about
Using data from the 2012 and 2016 American National
Election Studies, I demonstrate that social media use does
have a prominent correlation with political fear. This
effect seems likely to grow and affect our society more and
more as we progress in the digital age.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
To study how social media use catalyzes political
fear,multiple factors must be examined. Direct observation
of this causal relationship is impossible; there are no
statistics that are evident or brain scan that can be
easily done. Therefore, I will develop the relationship
between variables we can observe, and why those
observations are likely to be links in the causal chain
that social media is catalyzing political fear.
I will review how social media’s effect on political
behavior has already been established. I will also review
the digital divide leaves some populations more vulnerable
to influence and manipulation. Furthermore, I will address
how fear impacts political behavior in general. I will
examine how social media affects emotions in general, then
more specifically fear. The media, in general, affects
political fear, and I propose that social media directly
influences political fear.
3

Social Media and Political Behavior
Social media and the internet have changed the way
people interact with each other and their governments. The
ways in which they are able to interact with each other
have changed dramatically with the advent of social media.
Many of our traditional venues for interaction with each
other or our local political leadership are fading away
(Putnam, 2000). The internet has developed a new venue for
interacting with each other and our politics, be it through
engaging in political discussion or through interaction
with political actors (Bimber, 1999; DiMaggio et al, 2001).
The precarious conclusion is that the changes in
behavior are a result of events that lead from exposure,
causing a change in attitudes and opinions, to the
resultant actions (Kruglanski et al, 2015). It assumes that
while the person is using social media they are exposed to
stimuli that trigger a strong emotional reaction, such as
fear or anger, making them want to take action in the
situation, more than specific behaviors that would be more
comfortable for them (Knoll et al, 2020).
Further complicating this question of a causal chain
between the stimuli to actions, we are looking at whether
the emotional and attitudinal pressure builds up to the
4

level of inspiring impactful actions, or whether the
release of pressure of a low effort form of political
action, such as a tweet, status update or post keeps the
internal pressure from building to the point that real
behavioral change requires (Hassid, 2012; Kristofferson,
2014).
While controversial, because it seems a questionable
causal argument, studies suggest that social media use has
fanned the flames of many protest actions around the world
(Bekmagambetov et al, 2018; Gainous et al, 2015;2017). The
more frequently people participated in online debate, the
more likely they were to participate in the collective
action that connects people around a shared
grievance(Alberici & Milesi 2013).
While there is some fear that it may cause younger
generations to eschew traditional political participation
(Gainous et al, 2015), it seems clear that there are
influencing factors in play, even the dreaded “slacktivism”
isn’t entirely lost effort. People who engage even in token
activity are more invested in a cause than someone who has
not been involved in any way. Because only a fraction of
people take part in action, it doesn’t manifest the desired
change, when millions commit their support to making
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something happen, however they are more likely to be
involved after a simple investment than otherwise (Chou et
al, 2020; Boulianne & Theocharis, 2018). There is a strong
correlation between online political activities and taking
part in offline, and more traditional, political
participation from contacting politicians , protesting and
simply voting (Boulianne & Theocharis, 2018)
This seems to be made evident by the number of
governments that are attempting to influence political
behavior by influencing the “digital commons” that social
media usage explores. Gunitsky (2015) addresses how
governments use social media to rile up counter movements,
to framing a cause in different lights to change the
framing of the movement, autocratic, semi-autocratic
governments and candidates see the power that social media
has on political behavior, and utilize it to increase their
influence on the populace (Gunitsky, 2015). The flow of
information that people experience through the internet has
a significant effect on people’s opinions about their own
government. These opinions can be manipulated by the
government in question or other organizations affecting the
flow of information(Gainous et al, 2016).

6

People will use a medium that they trust to get their
news. In places where traditional media is primarily
controlled, or at least influenced, by the government, they
have been able to manipulate people into holding higher
levels of trust. While people who are using social media
are seeing information from trusted individuals that may be
critical of the government. Those people who use social
media are significantly more likely to have an emotional
response that leads to action (Gainous et al, 2018).
Governments are also investing time, expertise, and
money into directly influencing the algorithms that control
what is visible on social media, and it's more passive
effect on the populace, and its tendency to passively
stratify issues and perspectives (Katzenbach, 20109). This
influence can allow governments to passively censor things
by keeping radical ideas near the bottom of the feed, while
still allowing those with radical ideas to share and vent.
However, it isn’t just governments that censor social
media. Through the collection of forums that makes up much
of modern social media, people are able curate their feeds
to decrease the amount of undesirable concept exposures,
and ordinary people who are moderating their forums, from
Reddit to Facebook groups, have the ability to censor out
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viewpoints they disagree with. This can substantially shift
the perceived dialogue and change the political
conversation (Ashokkumar et al, 2020).
The effect social media has on campaigns can also be
seen as a positive in many ways. Many candidates use social
media to broadcast an image of not being part of the
“establishment” (Gainous and Wagner, 2014) to separate
themselves from career politicians that many people see as
the “problem”. President Trump in 2016 was often seen as
“authentic” by many of his followers, he led a campaign
that was seen as amateurish and not the kind of campaign
that a professional politician would use to run for
president. This is especially evident when compared to the
highly professional campaign of Hilary Clinton. But, this
perceived difference led to excitement and trust that
propelled him into office (Enli, 2017)
The internet has long been feared as a method to
incite polarization. Much of our common ground is weakened
when we get news from our preferred sources, rather than
shared common ground. This leads to increased anger at the
opposing party (DiMaggio et al, 2001; Hasell & Weeks,
2016). Social media has accelerated this

polarization on

the political spectrum. Grover (2019) suggests that this
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can be linked in part to the difference in messaging of
major candidates in an election. Candidates are able to use
social media to influence party attitudes, by making
personal views into specific political positions, and
making that part of the platform. The ensuing shares and
retweets allow it to appear as a part of the parties
mainstream beliefs (Grover et al, 2019).
Social media also allows people to let out their anger
and hate through social media, with little consequence.
This lack of self moderation leads to people having more
extreme attitudes and increased conflict (Altheide, 2016).

9

The Digital Divide
Political participants are not all influenced equally
by social media and the internet. There are several major
areas of “digital divide” that affect the way people access
the internet, what people do when they access the web, the
quality of an individual's access, and what types of social
media they use.
This divide has multiple distinct rifts. Quality of
access is one of the first issues. Access varies from
country to country and is impacted by, and directly affects
the economics of each country. Poorer populations are less
able to afford internet access. Because of the relative
poverty, development of infrastructure that lowers cost and
adds accessibility is unattractive. Cultural and language
variables play a direct role on internet usage; those able
to understand languages spoken by larger populations are
distinctly advantaged over those who speak smaller and
local dialects (Guillen & Suarez, 2005). Many of the same
issues impact access in rural areas, where access may be
slower, and urban areas, where there is limited cost
effective, quality internet connection. The cross-cultural
divide between rural and urban cultures also has affected
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the amount of time it has taken for those populations to
adopt internet use (Hindman, 2000).
In rural areas, this lack of experience with the
internet leaves people with less “information literacy.”
This leaves them more vulnerable to misleading and abusive
content on the internet. Whether fake news, or people
trying to defraud them, rural populations are more
vulnerable to those trying to take advantage of them (Yu et
al, 2017;2015).
Many of those factors have decreased through time,
trade, and cultural imperialism. People throughout much of
the world have access to the global economy through the
internet than ever before (Friedman, 2005). The legacy of
lack of access in those areas still impacts the populations
of those countries and rural areas as a whole. This
economic element of the digital divide that has had a
lasting impact on the people’s health, education,
communication, and economic viability. This exacerbates the
issue leading to groups falling further and further behind
(Bertot, 2003). Those who are digitally disadvantaged are
more vulnerable to behavioral control and emotional
manipulation through those mediums (Hsiah et al, 2006).
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Another critical rift is age, older populations are
generally less likely to use the internet than younger
groups. Their use of social media is also a more recent
development, generally motivated by social connection to
friends and family (Friemel, 2014).
This divide doesn’t heavily impact the economic
potential of the older populations. Older populations are
often either firmly established in their careers, or
retired (Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018). While it is heavily
affected by their socioeconomic status,it is exacerbated by
older populations' lack of desire, or perceived need, to
adopt new technologies (Niehaves & Plattfaut, 2014).
This digital divide impacts their health, both social
and physical. This use both increases mental activity,
lowering the risk of developing mental impairment, and
increases education about health issues they are facing
(Hunsaker & Hargittai, 2018).
Social interactions are also dramatically lower
amongst seniors that don’t use the internet. This has a
negative impact on their community connections

and social

capital (DiMaggio et al, 2001). They are also left more
vulnerable to disinformation due to lack of “information
literacy” (Yu et al, 2015).
12

This concept of a digital divide leads to both
digitally advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The
disadvantaged groups may be more vulnerable to fake news
and populist propaganda, making them more easily
influenced. Fear is often utilized in many types of
propaganda, and can be very effective at influencing
political behavior.

13

Political Fear
Political fear has been examined most commonly
precursor for a political ideology.

as a

Evidence suggests that

fear is a precursor for conservative ideas and beliefs, or
that a specific set of cognitive biases are related to
conservatism. That the inability to cope with underlying
fear and uncertainty plays a role in the development of
conservative political beliefs(Jost, et al 2003).
Perceived threat, regardless of political
identification, is shown to impact support for policies of
varying kinds. People with identified fear supported action
in Afghanistan at a higher rate post 9/11 then others,
regardless of political disposition(Huddy, et al 2005).
The physiological fear response is notably different
in people. Those who have a stronger startle response to
gunshots or threatening images were more likely to have
strong feelings about security. The manifestation occurs in
various ways, such as being pro gun and owning weapons, or
being in favor of increased defense spending(Oxley et al
2008).
Critically, fear is shown to directly affect political
behavior. Fear is shown to have a significant effect on
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political participation when competing for resources; fear
and anger both had a dramatically stronger effect than
enthusiasm. When controlling for political skills and
resources, fear also had the strongest effect of the
emotional categories. For “cheap” participation such as a
bumper sticker, voting or talking about a candidate, fear
has a stronger effect on political behavior than enthusiasm
or anger, although anger is far more likely to illicit
contributions (Valentino et al, 2011).
Fear has played an increasing role in our political
discourse. Past politicians stoked fear of outside forces,
such as Nazis or Soviets; now leadership plays on fear of
internal opposition. A cultural divide has developed that
creates a primal “us vs them” response, causing people to
fear the position of the other team, and that it will harm
them(Iyengar et al 2014).
Populist candidates throughout the world are found to
use political messaging and appeals that are more likely to
use negative emotions. Fear, anger, disgust and sadness are
used far more often to elicit strong responses (Windmann,
2020). As a wise alien once said “Fear is the path to the
dark side…fear leads to anger…anger leads to hate…hate
leads to suffering” (Lucas, 1999) While not an authority on
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psychology, there is truth to the idea that negative
emotions can lead to a powerful and dangerous wave of
political power that populist candidates have ridden to
power in many places and times.
Fear encourages people to speak their minds, it
triggers the fight or flight response which either way,
leads to action. Altheide (2016) suggests that Trump
purposefully incited political fear, and pushed people to
“speak their minds.” This allowed people to bring their
bigotry and impulsivity to the forefront. Social media then
allows people a nearly consequence free place to spit their
vitriol. This magnified the emotional momentum and led
people who would not normally act (vote) to go and act
(Altheide, 2016)
Fear is also used by populist candidates by
effectively engineering a threat, and then to create a
clear and concise answer that their ideological opposites
have trouble competing with. If Trump’s campaign could make
undecided voters afraid of the threat of “undocumented
murderous rapist immigrants flowing like a river across the
unprotected border” then they tell you that they have a
solution, then the opposition’s response of, “they aren’t a
threat, and the solution won’t work” is not effective
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because it doesn’t deal with the emotional response.
Similar rhetoric was used in Brexit, suddenly politicians
were convincing the people that “the rest of the European
Union will drag us down and destroy who we are, and so we
have a plan to deal with it!” It is much more enticing than
the counterpoint, “No they won’t”. These fear messages not
only radicalize their base, they attract voters to take a
side on an issue to which they were previously unconcerned
(Scheller, 2019).
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Media’s Impact on Emotions
The media has utilized and been driven by fear since
long before the internet and the silicon valley appended
“social” prefix. Traditional media and governments have
long used fear as a form of social control. While fear may
be obvious as a motivator for anti crime bills or military
spending bills, this can be expanded into many other areas
of influence. When framing issues with fear, broadcasters
have been able to make their stories familiar and the
importance of the issue more pronounced (Altheide &
Machalowski, 1999).
The Hollywood media has also changed the way we
process and appreciate fears. Fear was made into something
fun and interesting through the development of suspense
thrillers and horror movies. This further increases the
effectiveness of the fear framing by making this something
that people are conditioned to be intrigued by rather than
something that some people would want to avoid (Altheide &
Machalowski, 1999).
These discourses of fear lead things to be framed
specifically through the lens of fear. After the Columbine
shooting, media outlets used the leverage of fear to go
after specific elements that they believed were
18

problematic. They framed “outsiders” as potential school
shooters, and used the event as leverage to change the
discussion about security and the role of police in school.
While intended to make students safer, it would often lead
to targeting students who were different from the group or
didn’t fit in, in the name of “safety”. Getting away from
the narrative that people wanted to present and allowing
fear to take the center stage (Altheide, 2009). Media’s
presentation of much of the world through a “problem frame”
uses fear to drive a narrative meant to influence the
masses and create “social control”, allowing the media to
continue to profit by keeping people afraid (Altheide,
2004).
Emotion is heavily used in journalism, while some
“purists” view it as sensationalism and the practice of
tabloids, but the news has always been closely intertwined
with emotions even when people want to deny it. People
connect to the story with their interior world of emotions.
But denying that events that affect people are emotionally
important does not lead to good reporting, or even good
dissemination of information (Peters, 2011).
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Social Media and Emotions
Because of the nature of the hybrid media, all of the
ways that traditional media influences emotions are still
true for social media, broadcasters and organizations dove
headfirst into utilizing social media to advance many of
their ongoing efforts. Pulling the new tools into the same
mission, just like radio, television and every other major
change has been put to use by the actors already in motion
(Chadwick, 2017).
Social media, and the fast paced movement of internet
users in the social media era, has also accelerated changes
in the way the media presents information. Social media
prompted a trend towards reducing events into bite size
pieces of “news”, with a beginning, middle and ending,
rather than an ongoing story that affects society. It also
accelerated and reduced political communication into simple
messages, rather than an ongoing conversation (Altheide,
2004).
Catchy and sensationalized titles, often referred to
as clickbait, are designed to elicit a quick emotional
response to engage readers with the content. Readers become
more sensitive to the emotional pleas of this practice,
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rewarding media elements that use this emotional
manipulation (Blom & Hansen, 2014.)
The effects of social media have had both positive and
negative effects on journalism and the media. While it
fosters connections with journalists, politicians, actors
and other public icons, it creates a two way connection
that

previously did not exist. New players now have the

bandwidth to influence media operators as powerfully as
traditional politicians and media. Conversely, it also
leads to increased harassment and pressures on those
people, impacting the emotions and actions of the
influencers on our society (Lewis & Molyneux, 2018).
Social media has a unique set of effects on how people
interact with each other and the world, and has new and
powerful effects on emotions. Emotions spread like wildfire
on social media. Emotionally charged tweets, both positive
and negative, are more likely to be retweeted than
emotionally neutral and informational tweets. Stieglitz and
Dang-Xuan (2014) demonstrate that emotionally charged
tweets are retweeted more often, and with less delay
between posting, reading and retweets. This increases the
likelihood of people using emotionally charged tweets, and
inundates the Twitter user with emotionally charged
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material. Emotionally charged information has become
dramatically more available to people than strictly
objective and data driven information (Stieglitz &
Dang-Xuan, 2013). Further, “soft” news and information
about things like relationships and education is much more
likely to be engaged with than “hard” news issues like
politics or current events (Kalsnes & Larsson, 2018).
Emotions also directly affect behavior on social
media. Anger and fear specifically influence our online
behavior in combative ways, different from excitedly
sharing. It has been found that angry people are more
likely to be involved in online debate, and conflict with
other people. This effect is observed with both political
and nonpolitical discussions. While it can’t be ruled out
that it may be the debating online itself that is making
them angry, it creates a feedback loop of negative emotion
reenforcing the behavior (Wollebaek et al 2019).
Emotional contagion is also a major factor in social
media, as the general attitudes of the posts that people
see affect both their current emotional state, as well as
the ongoing emotional attitude about an issue. Anger also
leads to increased sharing or retweeting and posts about a
given issue (Kramer et al, 2014).
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Social Media Use and Fear
Social media’s effect on some types of emotions have
been studied extensively. Specifically there is a large
body of literature, both academically and in popular blogs
and websites, that addresses the effect Social media has on
the “Fear of Missing Out” popularized as the acronym FoMO.
This fear is an anxiety that there are rewarding
experiences out there that they are missing. This keeps
them wanting to be constantly engaged with their social
media platforms in order to make sure they don’t miss
things. This leads to increased distraction and negative
academic performance, and increased likelihood of checking
texts and notifications while driving decreasing safety for
themselves and those around them (Przybylski et al, 2013).
This general stressor can also lead to increased
relationship tension as the demands of keeping up with
expectations, jealousy of others experiences, and tension
that comes from conflict and drama that is specific to the
social media experience. These forces create anxiety and
strain on people’s minds. A negative feedback loop forms in
which the anxiety it creates is directly responsible for
making users more likely to continue checking their social
media to keep up with said conflicts (Fox & Moreland 2014).
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These social media addictions can also catalyze mental
health disorders, especially anxiety. Anxiety is often used
interchangeably with fear. One of the obvious primary
symptoms of anxiety disorders is varying levels of chronic
fear/anxiety throughout life which has been triggered or
exacerbated by social media use (Rosen 2013; Woods & Scott
2016).
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Social Media Use and Political Fear and Anger
Politicians on both sides of the political spectrum
leverage fear, anger and other negative emotions through
their social media accounts addressing the population. They
use these negative emotions to highlight issues that are
critical to their base, and color their statements about
each issue with emotional tones to affect the way people
think about those issues. This may lead to increased
polarization when our political positions are so highly
influenced by emotions rather than “ownership” (Enders,
Gainous, and Wagner, 2020)
Social media has also been used effectively to spread
disinformation and increase Islamophobia in much of the
world. By focusing on a threat, political actors are able
increase the strength of their general position. By being
able to circumvent the “political correct” phrasing and
statements through the use of social media, blogs and
highly partisan news sources they are able to disseminate
ideas that spread naturally and shift the over ideology of
a party (Ekman, 2015).
During the Covid 19 crisis Trump has used social media
to lash out at, and spread doubt and fear not about the
disease, but rather the scientists and doctors who were
25

meant to be tracking and treating the disease. Directly
using social media to change the dialogue from one of unity
against the pandemic and created doubt and anger at
democrats or the “deep state” who he believed were hyping
the pandemic to make him look bad (Altheide, 2020).
Fear has not been shown to keep people from viewing
and searching out alternate political information. It has,
in fact, been found to have some effect on encouraging
people to go out and find conflicting information. Anger,
however, consistently kept people from pursuing sources of
information that would present information through an
opposing lens, thereby strengthening the walls of the “echo
chamber”. Both emotions are consistently found to increase
online political participation through social media
(Wollebaek et al, 2019).
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Hypotheses
First, social media has a distinct effect on emotions
that is likely to be stronger than traditional media. Due
to the emotionally engaging nature of social media, this
could directly affect the behavior of voters. If
interactions through social media are able to get people to
protest against the government, it should easily have
influence on policy positions.
Second, throughout the literature, there is the
concept of the “digital divide.” It demonstrates that
younger populations are significantly more engaged in
social media, but also have increased “information
literacy” that helps to insulate them from some elements of
political manipulation. Digitally disadvantaged populations
are more easily manipulated through digital media (Hsiah et
al, 2006; Yu et al, 2017;2015) Anecdotally, evidence
suggests that it is the older population that is more
easily influenced by fear mongering techniques. This could
be especially important for the greater body of knowledge
if we can demonstrate this increased impact despite the
decreased use due to the digital divide.
My hypothesis is that the dependent variable fear
increases with our independent variable of social media
27

use. Furthermore, this effect will be stronger amongst
cohorts that did not grow up with social media, and lack
some “internet information literacy” such as Gen X and
Boomers.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND MEASUREMENT

The data for this study came from two major sources,
and is made up of individual-level data. This data came
from the 2016 American National Election Studies, as well
as the 2012 American National Election Studies. The
American National Election Studies is a time-series
collection of national surveys conducted during every
presidential election since 1948. The questions are split
between those designed to track long-term trends, and those
designed to help us understand that moment in politics. The
2012 ANES was completed through both face to face (n=2,054)
and internet (n=3,860) surveys for a total of 5,914
observations.

The 2016 ANES was completed through both

face to face (n=1,181) and internet (n=3,090) surveys for a
total of 4,271 observations. My basic strategy is to
estimate the relationship between an index of questions
that I created to measure fear and determine if it is
29

related to an index I created to measure social media
usage.
As highlighted above, my analysis is aimed at
answering the following questions: does social media usage
have a positive impact on self-reported fear indicators? If
there is a positive effect between social media use and
fear, is that effect stronger in Gen X and Boomer cohorts?
The first question is whether social media use has a
positive effect on self-reported fear and anxiety
indicators. This question is analyzed using multiple
indexes and using multivariate regression.
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Social Media Usage Index
The first index of social media use was created using
social media indicators weighted and measured to accurately
measure social media usage. In the ANES 2012 (Figure 3.1)
survey data this was
accomplished by using
an additive index of
three items, with a
Cronbach Alpha score of
.71 suggesting a high
internal consistency,
the first is “During a
typical week, how many
days do you use social
media such as Twitter
or Facebook to learn about the election for President?“
The responses were on an eight point scale with answers
that ranged from “None”, to “Seven Days”. After that
indicator I also used the political affairs profile
variables, “How often politics social media” with answers
ranging from and “Does not apply” to “A lot”; and the
variable “Politics info from social media” with answers
ranging from “Never” to “Every day”. The wording of the
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original questions for the political affairs profile
variables are not available. All of the variables were
ordered so that the higher number is higher levels of
social media use, and lower numbers are lower levels of
social media use. All three items were rescaled to range
from 0 to 1, while still maintaining the same intervals.
This shows distribution heavy in low scores with many
people not using social media heavily in 2012 for political
purposes.
In the ANES 2016 survey data the social media index
(Figure 3.2) was created from two items. The first is
“During a typical week,
how many days do you use
social media such as
Twitter or Facebook?”
The responses were on an
eight point scale with
answers that ranged from
“none”, up to “Seven
Days”. Then the question
“How many times did you
read, watch, or listen
to any information about the campaign for President on the
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Internet?” which had answers on a 4 point scale with
answers ranging from “None” to “A good many”. Each of these
items were ordered so that higher internet/social media use
were represented by higher values. Then all items were
rescaled to range from 0 to 1, while still maintaining the
same intervals. Then the variables were summed to again
create an additive index, with cronbach alpha score of .38,
while this does not suggest a high level of consistency, I
am using it to create a new variable that measures use of
social media for political news. The 2016 distribution is
dramatically different from the 2012 distribution because
of massively increased social media use, and an increase in
its use for political purposes.
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Candidate Fear Index
Then I created my “candidate fear index”. This is
based on the questions “Does the Republican/Democratic
candidate make you feel afraid?” In the 2012 ANES survey
data the questions
asked were “Has Barack
Obama, because of the
kind of person he is or
because of something he
has done, ever made you
feel afraid?” Which was
answered with a simple
“yes” or “no”. And “Has
Mitt Romney, because of
the kind of person he
is or because of something he has done, ever made you feel
afraid?”, which was also answered with a “yes” or “no”. The
candidate fear index (Figure 3.3) added these two together
which created a new variable where most voters said they
were afraid of one, many said they were afraid of neither,
and a few said they were afraid of both. This item is
ordered so that higher fear is represented by higher
values, rescaled to range from 0 to 1, while still
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maintaining the same intervals. The responses to these
questions were combined into a single variable, and an
average fear was created between the two, this eliminated
most of the partisanship bias because it created a
measurement of fearing a candidate, rather than a specific
candidate.
In the 2016 ANES survey data the questions were “How
often would you say you’ve felt afraid because of the kind
of person Hillary Clinton is or because of something she
has done?” The counterpart question was “How often would
you say you’ve felt afraid because of the kind of person
Donald Trump is or because of something he has done?” Both
of these items were measured on the same five point scale
(never, some of the
time, about half the
time, most of the time,
or always). The same
procedure was done to
add the two variables
together to create an
average candidate fear
index. This index
appears very different
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from the 2012 index because there is a higher range of
answers. The distribution (Figure 3.4) for this item shows
that many people reported that they are “always” afraid of
at least one candidate, with some even reporting that they
are “always” afraid of both candidates. This item is
ordered so that higher fear is represented by higher
values, rescaled to range from 0 to 1, while still
maintaining the same intervals.
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Economic Fear Index
Then a series of questions deemed “economic anxiety”
indicators were added together to create my Economic Fear
Index. These are questions such as “How much better/worse
off will you be next year?”, “How much better/worse will
unemployment be in the next year?”, and ”Will the economy
be better or worse in the next 12 months?”.
In the ANES 2012
survey data the
questions used in this
index (Figure 3.5) are
“What about the next 12
months? Do you expect
the economy, in the
country as a whole, to
get better, stay about
the same, or get
worse?” with the
italicized words being the options on a three point scale.
The next question used was “How about people out of work
during the coming 12 months, do you think that there will
be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”
also with a three point scale. Then finally “Now looking
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ahead, do you think that a year from now you and your
family will be better off financially, worse off, or just
about the same as now?” this item had to be rearranged as
worse off was the middle answer. All three of these
responses were reordered so that higher economic fear is
represented by higher values, then added together using the
same procedure as the other indices, and then rescaled to
range from 0 to 1, while still maintaining the same
intervals. Then summed into an additive index with a
Cronbach Alpha score of .66 suggesting a high internal
consistency. The distribution shows that more people
believed that the economy would improve than people who
believed it would get worse, with the majority clustered
toward staying about
the same.
For the ANES 2016
survey data (Figure
3.6) the first question
used was nearly
identical as 2012 “What
about the next 12
months? Do you expect
the economy, in the
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country as a whole, to get better, stay about the same, or
get worse?” with the italicized sections being the possible
answers on a three point scale. The next question is “How
about people out of work during the coming 12 months, do
you think that there will be more unemployment than now,
about the same, or less?” on a three point scale. The last
question in this index is “Now looking ahead, do you think
that a year from now you and your family will be much
better off financially, somewhat better off, about the
same, somewhat worse off, or much worse off than now?” on a
five point scale. These were combined into an additive
index using the same procedure as the previous index,
reordered so that higher economic fear is represented by
higher values, and then rescaled to range from 0 to 1,
while still maintaining the same intervals.This index has a
Cronbach Alpha score of .56 suggesting a moderate level
internal consistency, in the 2016. The distribution for
this item shows that the majority believe the economy will
stay about the same over the next 12 months, with a roughly
even distribution between those who believe it will get
better and those that believe that it will get worse.
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Controls
Finally, control indexes such as socioeconomic status,
age, ideology, and demographics were controlled for in a
multivariate regression model. This included questions in
both models for self reported gender, with a two point
scale of male and female, with a dummy variable created
where females are represented by the higher value. The next
control is ethnicity, in the ANES 2016 survey data the
respondent was given the options White (non-Hispanic),
Black (non-Hispanic), Asian, native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Island (non-Hispanic), Native American or Alaska
Native (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, and Other (non-Hispanic).
On the 2012 ANES survey data the respondent was given the
options White (non-Hispanic), Black (non-Hispanic),
Hispanic, and Other (non-Hispanic). For both of these
questions they were seperated into “White” and “Other”
because there were not enough respondents of the smaller
minorities to create a representative sample. A dummy
variable was created where those who identified as white
are represented by the higher value.
Age is represented in such a way that advanced age is
represented by a higher value.
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A socio economic status index was also created this
included two items that indicated education and income.
Both variables were reordered, so that increased income and
increased education are represented by higher values.
Rescaled from 0 to 1 and summed.
Ideology is controlled by use of the seven point scale
liberal/conservative self placement. These were arranged so
that those who identified as more conservative are
represented by a higher value, and more liberal represented
by a lower value.
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Generational Cohorts
The second question centers on whether the correlation
between social media use and fear is stronger in Gen X and
Boomer cohorts than in the Millennial cohort. I will look
at this in a couple of ways. First, during my regression
modeling I will determine if the effect gets stronger with
age. Then I will subset out each cohort. The cohorts will
be drawn from the Strauss-Howe generational theory, divided
as Boomers, who are those born between 1940 and 1964, Gen
Xers, who are those born between 1964 and 1984, and
Millenials, who are those born between 1984 and 2000. Each
of these subsets will be run through the same regression
models and the differences will be evaluated.
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Limitations
Some of the issues I encountered are whether my
indicators are effectively measuring fear. The primary fear
based question is “Does the Democratic/Republican
presidential candidate
make you feel afraid?”
This could be construed
as a question that only
really measures
partisanship rather
than fear. The
questions about the
next year may also not
be measuring general
fear/anxiety, it might
be that it better measures hope or lack of hope. So the
primary issue is whether I can effectively measure fear
using the ANES data.
After developing the first model a specific issue
though was discerned. Social media Usage had no relevant
effect on my initial “Fear Index”. I quickly realized the
first problem with these hypothesized results: social media
use has a different effect on fear of candidates than on
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fear about the economy.
This was the same
initial results that
were found in both the
2012 ANES data and the
2016 ANES data.
After discovering
this no more attempts
were made to combine
the Candidate Fear
Index with the Economic
Fear Index and they are treated as separate dependent
variables.
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CHAPTER 4: MODELING RESULTS
Modeling the 2012 ANES Survey Data
The first
model (Table 4.1 &
Figure 4.1) looks
specifically at
the 2012 ANES
data. Here my aim
was to determine
whether social
media has a
positive effect on
self reported fear
indicators. The results are apparent and statistically
significant. While controlling for major intervening
factors. The results here immediately show that social
media use has a statistically significant effect on
candidate fear indicators.
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This result was
stronger amongst
the Millennial
cohort than the
overall ANES 2012
population or any
of the other
individual
generational
cohorts. This is
contrary to my
expectations as I
expected due to the
digital divide the older cohorts would be more susceptible
to that influence. I was unable to control for the pure
volume of exposure that each generation actually receives.
Since older populations are less exposed to social media,
especially in 2012, having any measurable effect is
significant.
I see a significant effect on the dependent variable
from ideology where those who identify as more conservative
correlated with self reported fear. This is likely because
President Barack Obama is a more controversial figure than
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Senator Mitt
Romney whom he
was running
against. Though
it may also be
related to the
idea that
conservatives may
be more likely to
respond to fear
(Jost, et al
2003). This
correlation is demonstrated with the positive relationship
between an increase in conservatism and an increase in
candidate fear demonstrated in the ideology result (Table
4.1).
The second model (Table 4.2 & Figure 4.2) shows that
while it has a positive effect, increasing fear about the
presidential candidates, it has a weak negative effect on
Economic Fear indicators. Respondents across the ANES 2012
data may be slightly less likely to believe that the
economy or their individuals financial positions are likely
to get worse the more they use social media, although this
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is not a statistically
significant effect.
This is
counterintuitive to my
initial supposition
that a person who is
fearful about political
candidates is also
likely to be fearful
about the economy.
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Modeling the 2016 ANES Survey Data
In this second set of models, I look specifically at
the 2016 ANES data. Effectively, I am running the same
multivariate regressions for the 2016 data as the 2012 data
This model has a degree of increased nuance because the
questions about candidate fear had a broader gradation than
just yes or no. Moreover, there was in general a larger
amount of fear in the 2016 elections cycle than there was
in 2012. There was also a dramatic increase in social media
use across all cohorts from 2012 to 2016. With the majority
of people saying they regularly get political news through
social media in 2016, rather than a minority saying they
ever get political news through social media. This increase
in variation of answers allows increased confidence in the
2016 results.
In the first
model (Table 4.3 &
Figure 4.3) in the
2016 data we see
results consistent
with our
expectations of
seeing a
significant
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positive effect
between social
media usage and
candidate fear.
Different from the
2012 models, this
data shows that not
only does social
media use have an
effect on the
respondents self
reporting that they
are afraid of the
candidate(s), but it also shows that increased social media
usage affects the amount of fear that the respondents are
willing to report.
This effect was strongest amongst Millennials and
Generation X, and weakest among the Boomer cohort. In this
model though we predict an effect amongst the Boomers, it
is not statistically significant. This again runs
counterintuitive to my initial hypotheses that the effect
would be stronger amongst the Generation X and Boomer
cohorts.
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The results of the
2016 economic
model came out
basically the
same, showing that
social media use
still has a
negative effect on
economic fear. The
only significant

correlations with
economic fear ideology
with those who
identified as more
conservative having a
higher self reported
economic fear.
The overall
increase in fear about
political candidates
caused by social media
usage may affect voting behavior. Looking at the basic
“Calculus of Voting” equation R = pB − C + D (Riker &
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Ordeshook 1968) The person who fears an opposing candidate
has an increased likelihood of voting as it affects both
the “B” variable, which is the perceived differences
between the candidates. If a voter not only disagrees with
the candidate, but actively fears them, this suggests that
there is like a larger gap between the two options. It may
also create an additional effect on the “D” variable, the
psychological reward for voting, as it creates a degree of
satisfaction about standing up to or opposing something
that they fear.
In the 2016 election we saw the highest voter turnout
ever after campaigns that led many to fear both candidates.
Despite the fact that it was the highest voter turnout, it
was not the highest percentage turnout of eligible voters.
This effect may have been curtailed by the fact that many
people were to some degree afraid of both candidates. Some
people may not have seen them as different, but rather that
they were choosing between the lesser of two evils.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
My primary purpose is to determine if social media
usage influences fear in the United States. The internet is
a powerful tool in American culture. It may be able to
cause drastic changes in political attitudes, adding to the
fear level of the overall population. I hypothesized that
social media use will increase exposure to fear-inducing
news and political propaganda, therefore increasing fear.
Furthermore, this effect is getting stronger and it is
strongest among populations that have not grown up
expecting sensationalized, partisan news.
It is clear social media usage has an impact on
political fear. In 2012 increased social media usage
increased the likelihood that a voter would express fear of
one of the candidates. In 2016 we were able to see that it
affected how often the people felt afraid of the candidate.
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The use of social media did not lead to a more fearful
person, as we had expected. Rather, while it increased
political fear, it did not increase economic fear, and
marginally increased economic optimism. Perhaps people who
were using social media were more likely to have support
and understand technological development, which is the
largest piece of our economic growth.
The theorized increased impact on the older two
cohorts was not evident in this data. The theory could be
innately wrong, and that they are not as vulnerable to the
propaganda and fake news as I originally predicted. It also
becomes hard to measure because the study only asks how
many days a week that people are using social media.
Perhaps, if we were able to control for hours a day used,
or which platforms are being used we may see different
results.
This effect will likely continue to grow in importance
and impact as we as a society get more of our social
interaction, media, and news through social media and the
internet in general. Its usage has the potential to make us
more aware as a society to the plight of others, or to be
used by populists and those with ill intentions to further
political agendas through fear.
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